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NEGATIVE SUBGOALS WITH FREE VARIABLES 
MATTHEW L. GINSBERG 
D PROLOG systems currently work with the restriction that negative sub- 
goals must not contain free variables, although some authors have sug- 
gested that this restriction can be lifted by running the theorem prover to 
exhaustion on the subgoal being considered. We suggest that this ap- 
proach is likely not to be computationally viable in practice, and describe 
and formalize a new approach to dealing with quantified default queries 
that avoids this difficulty. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following PROLOG fragment:’ 
f :- notfgfx)). 
g(A). 
The interpretation we will assign to the implication f : - not (g (x 1 1 will be 
that it is universally quantified over x, and therefore corresponds to the implica- 
tion 
vx.11 g(x) ?fl (1) 
or, equivalently, 
[3x. -I g(x)1 If. 
Given this interpretation, what should the response be if we provide the system 
with the query f?2 
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‘Throughout this paper, we will reverse the PROLOG convention of capitalizing variables and 
leaving object constants in lowercase; the reason for this is to establish uniformity with the mathemati- 
cal convention of having variables in lower case. We will also take letters late in the alphabet (x, y, z) to 
be variables, and letters early in the alphabet (A, B, C) to be object constants. 
‘Conventional PROLOG syntax [6] interprets f : - no t ( 9 ( x ) 1 by passing the quantifier through 
the implication, effectively obtaining p’x. 7 g(x)] of instead of (1). By doing this, some of the problems 
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Intuitively, we would expect the query to succeed, since f follows from any 
negative instance of g, and the only known positive instance of g is for the 
argument A. In practice, however, this is not the case. The standard evaluation 
procedure used by PROLOG will fail for f, since the negative subgoal 7 g(x) 
succeeds (by binding x to A). 
This conclusion is also supported by the work by Gelfond and Lifschitz [lo], 
which augments a PROLOG program with domain-closure and uniqueness- 
of-names assumptions. Thus in the above example, they would include an axiom 
stating that A was the only object in the domain in question. The query f would 
then fail as a result. 
The counterintuitive nature of this conclusion is apparent if we modify our 
program to become the following: 
f :- not(g(x)). 
g(A). 
h(B). 
Now Gelfond and Lifschitz would have the query f succeed, since there is a new 
object, B, appearing in the domain description. This seems unjustified, however, 
since the information about B has nothing to do with f or with g.3 
The problems become more subtle if we allow the potential proof of g to itself 
be an argument using negation as failure: 
f :- not(g(x)). 
g(x) :- not(h(x)). 
h(A). 
Intuitively, f is true except if g holds for all values of its argument; g holds except 
where h does. Since h is true at A but not elsewhere, g is true everywhere except 
A. Thus g is false at A, and f is valid. A conventional PROLOG interpreter, 
however, will not respond sensibly to the intermediate query g (x 1, and may not 
return this result.4 
Finally, we note that if we add the premise g (A) to the above program 
fragment, the query f should fail. We shall see shortly that this particular 
nonmonotonic feature of the problem we are considering places further constraints 
on procedures designed to respond correctly to queries of this sort. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: We begin in the next section by 
examining briefly some previous efforts to deal with this problem and discussing, in 
informal terms, our solution to it. In Section 3, we discuss the nature of the 
problem from a formal point of view, formalizing the idea of an answer “schema” 
that can be used to report a partial solution to an unbound negative subgoal, and 
we shall be discussing are avoided, although rules such as f ( x ) : - no t ( g ( x 1 ) remain problematic 
if the variable x is not bound in the query f ( x 1. There is a growing consensus that (1) is a more natural 
interpretation in any event [l, 5,171. 
31ndeed, recent work of Przymusinska nd Przymusinski describing the semantics of logic programs 
has suggested ropping the domain closure assumption and not restricting our attention to Herbrand 
models of the theory in question [19]. 
41n fact, the correct result may be returned, but for completely the wrong reason-since h ( x 1 
succeeds for x bound to A, not (g ( x 1) fails and f therefore succeeds. 
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describing in precise terms conditions under which such answer schemas are 
satisfactory responses to a PROLOG query. In Section 4, we address some 
technical difficulties arising out of this definition. Our procedural suggestions for 
solving the problem begin in Section 5, where we discuss the case where the 
investigation of the negative subgoal involves no additional default assumptions. In 
Section 6, we go on to extend our methods in a way that allows us to drop this 
assumption; in Section 7, we consider problems arising from interactions between 
positive and negative subgoals with free variables. 
Section 8 shows our techniques at work by discussing a simple planning example 
in some depth; this example is one that cannot be treated by existing descriptions 
of negative subgoals containing unbound variables. Concluding remarks are con- 
tained in Section 9. 
2. PREVIOUS WORK 
PROLOG’s requirement that negative subgoals be ground has been addressed in 
the literature only very recently. The various suggestions that have been made 
[3,4,7,9,18,20] all involve finding precise solutions to subgoals of this type, 
generally by enumerating or characterizing in some other way the exceptions to a 
subgoal such as 7 g(x) arising out of (1). Chan suggests in [3] that the exceptions 
to the subgoal T g(x) be characterized by running the interpreter to exhaustion on 
the positive subgoal g(x) and collecting the results, while Foo et al. in [9] make the 
extraordinary suggestion that the free variable (x, in this case> be bound to all of 
its reasonable instantiations and the theorem prover be invoked on each of the 
resulting subgoals 7 g(A,), . . . , 7 g(A,). Chan goes on to describe in some detail 
how information of the form “ 7 g(x) holds for all x except x E {C,, . . . , C,]” can 
be manipulated when solving subsequent subgoals. This work is quite reminiscent 
of earlier analysis due to Colmerauer and Kunen [7,181. 
Even for finite domains, Foo’s suggestion seems completely unworkable for 
problems of interesting size, while Chan’s approach, known as constructive nega- 
tion, is likely to run into trouble if there are a large or infinite number of solutions 
to the positive subgoal g(x), or if these solutions are overly expensive to compute. 
In [4], Chan attempts to address this difficulty by proposing that the solutions to 
g(x) not be computed explicitly, but only be characterized in some sharp way that 
is sufficient to enable subsequent subgoals to be processed. 
All of these ideas seem very much at odds with the natural interpretation of 
PROLOG’s negation operator as a nonmonotonic one [13]. The work on non- 
monotonic reasoning has made it clear that in many problems involving negation as 
failure, it is impractical or impossible either to enumerate the exceptions to a 
default rule or to characterize them in any precise way. As an example, when 
trying to decide whether or not some particular bird can fly, it is impractical to 
either compare it with all the birds known not to fly (the chicken we had for 
dinner, the penguin I saw in the zoo yesterday, and so on) or to compare it with all 
of the types of birds known not to fly (ostriches, emus, birds with their feet set in 
concrete, and so on>. The first approach corresponds to constructive negation as 
Chan originally described it in [31, while the second is similar to his more recent 
suggestions. 
Here is another example: Suppose that I am leaving for work in the morning, 
and notice that my wife has left her car parked behind mine in the driveway. To 
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get to work, I form the plan of moving her car, and then getting into mine and 
driving to work. But if my intention is to move her car to some particular location 
1, I encounter the negative subgoal 
lbad-choice(f), 
where bad - c h o i c e(l) indicates that moving her car to 1 won’t help me achieve 
my goal of getting to work. 
In practice, there are many poor choices for 1. Moving the car an inch or so is 
unlikely to help me get out of the driveway. Driving it into the neighbor’s living 
room is also probably unwise, since the ensuing ruckus is likely to delay me 
considerably, I don’t bother enumerating all of these possible difficulties, or even 
considering them. I simply plan to get in my wife’s car, move it, and then drive to 
work. Provided that I don’t pick some pathological choice for her car’s new 
location, everything will be fine. 
This idea is the essence of the approach that we will propose in this paper. 
Roughly speaking, given a negative subgoal containing a free variable, we will 
replace the variable with a Skolem constant and then evaluate the resulting 
(ground) subgoal. If this Skolemized subgoal succeeds, we will interpret this as 
meaning that the original negative subgoal 7 g(x) succeeds for all “nonpathologi- 
cal” choices of X. In order to make these ideas more precise, we will do the 
following: 
1. First, we will formalize the idea of a solution schema that holds for 
“almost” all of its ground instantiations. 
2. The bulk of the paper will present a procedure that produces such solution 
schemas for queries involving negative subgoals with free variables. 
3. Finally, we will present a detailed example of a simple planning problem 
that has features of the sort we are discussing. We will argue that the 
approach we are proposing is both more natural and more efficient than 
either the conventional one or that of constructive negation. 
3. SOLUTION SCHEMAS 
We begin by formalizing our suggestion that when presented with a nonground 
default query for which it may not be reasonable to return either a list of all 
possible answers or a list of all exceptions to a possible answer, it may well be 
reasonable to return an answer that holds “in general”.5 
To make precise the notion of a set of exceptions that is “small” compared to 
the set of instances of the schema for which the goal in fact holds, we begin by 
augmenting our language (which we assume to be finite) to include an infinite 
number of new constant symbols, which we will denote by si as i ranges over the 
5Note that it does not suffice to say that an answer schema holds in general whenever it is 
satisfactory except for finitely many bindings of the variables it contains. The reason for this is that in 
an infinite domain, an expression may be a satisfactory answer schema even if there are infinitely many 
expressions for which it fails-provided that the set of exceptions is somehow “small” relative to the 
size of the domain in its entirety. This argument also applies to any domain that includes function 
symbols. 
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positive integers. We will generally refer to the si as Skolem constants, since we 
are requiring that they not appear in our declarative database. 
We will make the unique-names assumption with regard to these symbols, so 
that for any two functional expressions f(x,, . . . , x,) and g(y,, . . . , y,) such that 
some si appears in either, we only have 
f(x 1,...,x,) =g(Y,,...,Y,) 
if f = g, m = n, and xi = yi for each i.6 
Definition 3.2. Let f be a functional expression, and u a binding list. We will say 
that cr is nontriuiul for f if the set of ground instances of f IO is a proper subset 
of the set of ground instances of f. 
Essentially, u is nontrivial for f if it gives a nontrivial binding for some variable 
or variables that appear in f. 
Definition 3.2. Let f be a functional expression, and S a set of ground instances of 
f. We will say that S is of measure 0 in f provided that one of the following 
conditions holds: 
1. There is a nontrivial binding u for f such that every element of S is an 
instance of f Iv, or 
2. S is the finite union of sets of measure 0 in f. 
If S is a set of ground instances of f, we will say that S is of measure 1 in f 
whenever the complement of S in the set of instances of f is of measure 0 in f. 
Our terminology is borrowed from mathematical analysis. Roughly speaking, if 
f is a functional expression involving n variables, we can think of the ground 
instances of f as making up an n-dimensional space; after applying a nontrivial 
binding to f, the ground instances make up at most an n - l-dimensional space. 
Assuming that the set of possible instantiations for a single variable is infinite, any 
finite union of n - l- or smaller-dimensional subsets will be small relative to the 
n-dimensional space that contains them. 
As an example, consider the functional expression g(x). The set S = (g(A)) 
consisting of a single ground instance is of measure 0 in the set of all ground 
instances of g(x), since every element of S is an instance of g(x)IXzA. 
The reason that we need to make the unique-names assumption about expres- 
sions involving the Skolem constants is so that we can prove the following: 
Proposition 3.3. Let f be a functional expression. Then there is no set S that is both of 
measure 0 and of measure 1 in f. 
It is this proposition that will put teeth in all of our subsequent results; it would 
be of little interest to show that the set of solutions to a particular query was of 
bNote that our assumption that there exist an infinite number of distinct object constants (the 
Skolem constants si) is actually in conflict with the domain-closure assumption made by Gelfond, 
Lifschitz, and others. 
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measure 1 in some functional expression f(x) if all sets of ground instances of 
f(x) were of measure 1 in f! 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3. We prove the result only for f of the specific form 
f(x); the general case is similar. 
Let si be any Skolem constant in our language. Note that if (T is a nontrivial 
binding for f(x) such that f(si) is an instance of f(x)l,, then CT must be the 
binding list that binds x to si. It now follows from the unique-names assumption 
that for any nontrivial binding list (T, the set of ground instances of f(x)l, can 
contain at most a single element of the form f(si) for some si. 
As a result, any set of measure 0 in f can contain only finitely many elements of 
the form f(si). Since there are infinitely many such elements, there is no set S that 
is of measure 0 in f and whose complement is of measure 0 in f. 0 
Proposition 3.4. Let q(x) be a query, f a functional expression, and (Y a ground 
instance of f in which all of the variables have been bound to unique Skolem 
constants. Then the set of instances off for which q succeeds is of measure 1 in f if 
q(a) succeeds and of measure 0 in f otherwise. 
PROOF. Suppose we denote by S the set of all instances of f in which the variables 
have been bound to unique Skolem constants. The proposition now follows from 
the following two observations: 
1. q(a) succeeds if and only if q succeeds for every element of S, and 
2. S is of measure 1 in f. 
The first of these is immediate, since the Skolem constants do not appear 
elsewhere in the database and the truth or falsity of any particular element of S 
must therefore be independent of precisely which Skolem constants it contains. 
For the second, we suppose that f is of the form f(x, y); the general case is no 
harder. Now for any ground instance of f not to be in S, it must be of one of the 
following three forms: 
1. f<si, si> (i.e., x and y are not replaced with distinct Skolem constants), 
2. an expression where either x or y has been bound to an object constant 
that is not one of the Skolem constants si, or 
3. an expression where either x or y has been bound to a functional 
expression. 
Note, however, that each of the above three sets of ground instances is of 
measure 0 in f. The first is given by the nontrivial binding that binds x to y. The 
second is the finite union of the bindings that bind either x or y to each of the 
non-Skolem constant symbols in our language, and the third is a similar union of 
the result of binding x or y to an element of the particular functional form 
fi(a 1,. . . , ak), where fi is one of the function constants in the language (of which 
there are only finitely many). It follows that the complement of S is the union of 
three sets of measure 0 in f, and is therefore of measure 0 in f itself. Thus S is of 
measure 1 in f. 0 
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This proposition provides the fundamental justification for the ideas in this 
paper. Essentially, our approach will be to return answers involving Skolem 
constants when responding to PROLOG queries. Having done so, we can then 
reconstruct the functional expression f appearing in the proposition by replacing 
the Skolem constants in the answer with distinct variables, and then shall know 
that except for a set of measure 0, all ground instances of this functional 
expression will satisfy the original query. In practice, we may wish to return the 
answer with the Skolem constants included, since variables appearing in this 
expression can be bound to any constant in the language without affecting the 
validity of the result. 
As an example, consider the logic program 
f(x,y) :- not(g(y)). 
g(A). 
Our response to the query f(x, y) will be to bind y to the Skolem constant si, 
obtaining f(.x, si). Since x is unbound in this expression, it indicates that for any 
choice of x whatsoever, the query succeeds for all choices of y outside a set of 
measure 0 (in this case, all y except y =A). 
In order to make some of these ideas precise, we make the following definitions: 
Definition 3.5. Let f be a ground functional expression. We will denote by f the 
result of replacing distinct Skolem constants in f with distinct variables. Having 
done so, any ground instantiation of f will be called a Skolem instance off. 
As an example, suppose that f is the above expression f(x, si). Then f is the 
expression f(x, y), and any ground instance of this expression [such as f(A, B) or 
f(s,, B)l is a Skolem instance of f(x, si). 
Definition 3.6. Given a query q(x) and a ground functional expression f, we will 
say that f is an acceptable response to the query if the set of solutions to the 
query is of measure 1 in f. Given a query q(x) and an arbitrary functional 
expression f, we will say that f is an acceptable response to the query if every 
ground instantiation of f is an acceptable response to the query. 
An acceptable response f to the query will be called Skolem optimal if f is 
ground and there is no other acceptable ground response of which f is a 
nontrivial Skolem instance. The response will be called optimal if there is no 
other acceptable response (ground or otherwise) of which f is a nontrivial 
instance (Skolem or otherwise). 
In the above example, f(x, sl) is the unique optimal response. f(s2,s,) is 
Skolem optimal but not optimal; f(s,, g(sl)) is not Skolem optimal, because g(s,) 
is a nontrivial Skolem instance of si. Expressions such as f<x, y) are not accept- 
able responses, because the query fails for y =A. 
Lemma 3.7. A conventional PROLOG interpreter will return optimal responses to 
queries that do not generate negative subgoals with free variables. 
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PROOF. In the absence of Skolem constants, a response that is acceptable accord- 
ing to Definition 3.6 is acceptable by the usual standard. An optimal response is 
simply any most general response to the query. q 
With this formal machinery behind us, we are now in a position to state our 
intention in this paper: Given a procedure that produces optimal responses to 
PROLOG queries that do not generate negative subgoals with free variables, we will 
describe a procedure that produces optimal responses to all such queries, whether they 
generate such subgoals or not. 
4. OPTIMAL RESPONSES FROM SKOLEM OPTIMAL ONES 
We will achieve the above goal in two stages. The bulk of the paper will be devoted 
to describing a procedure that produces Skolem optimal responses to arbitrary 
queries; in this section, we show how to turn Skolem optimal responses into 
optimal ones. 
The basic difference between a Skolem optimal response and an optimal one is 
that while a Skolem optimal response indicates that “most” of its Skolem instances 
are solutions to the original query, a response in which the Skolem constants have 
been replaced with variables indicates that every instance is a solution to the 
original query. This suggests that in order to change a Skolem optimal solution to 
an optimal one, we need simply check to see if the various Skolem constants can 
be replaced with variables: 
Procedure 4.1. Suppose that we have some method for generating Skolem optimal 
responses to PROLOG queries, and that the response (Y has been generated in 
response to the query q. Now renumber the Skolem constants appearing in (Y so 
that they are si,..., s,, and do the following: 
1. Set i=l. 
2. Let p be the result of replacing all appearances of si in CY with a variable 
that does not appear elsewhere in (Y. 
3. Invoke the interpreter on the query 7 q(p). 
4. If this query fails, set (Y = p. If it succeeds, leave (Y unchanged. 
5. If i <n, increment i and return to step 2. Otherwise, return cr as a solution 
to the original query. 
To see this procedure working, we return to the example of the previous 
section, where we considered the PROLOG fragment 
f (x,y) :- not(g(y)). 
g(A). 
Suppose that in response to the query f(x, y), we are given the Skolem optimal 
answer f(sl, s,>. 
We begin by replacing si with x, generating the candidate solution f(x, s2). 
The interpreter on 7 f< x, s2) fails, since the positive version of this query, f(x, sz), 
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succeeds for every choice of X. This means that our solution remains acceptable if 
we do not replace x with the original Skolem constant si. 
We now turn to s2, replacing it with y to get the new candidate solution 
f(x, y). Now, however, the query 7 f(x, y) succeeds for some ground x and y; as 
an example, 7 f(B, A) is a consequence of the program being considered. We 
therefore replace s2 in the original expression, returning f(x, s2) as our response 
to the original query. 
In some cases, the answer returned by Procedure 4.1 may depend upon the 
order in which the Skolem constants are considered. As an example, consider the 
query 1 f(x, Y) in a situation where the database contains the single fact f(A, B). 
A Skolem optimal solution is 7 fC or, s,); depending on which Skolem variable is 
replaced first, either of the two optimal solutions 7 f(x, s2) and 7 f<s,, y> may be 
returned. 
Proposition 4.2. Given that our interpreter returns Skolem optimal responses to 
arbitrary queries, Procedure 4.1 will return optimal responses to arbitrary queries. 
Furthermore, any specific optimal response can be produced in this fashion. 
PROOF. For the first part, we need to show that the p returned by Procedure 4.1 is 
acceptable, and that it is optimal. To see that p is acceptable, we need simply note 
that when a Skolem constant in cy is replaced with a variable in the construction of 
p, the subgoal in step 3 of the procedure serves to ensure that there is no binding 
of this variable for which the original query fails. 
Showing that p is optimal is harder, although only slightly so. If j3 were not 
optimal, there would be some other acceptable response y of which p was an 
instance. Now if we replace every variable in y with a new Skolem constant to 
obtain the ground expression y’, it follows that -y’ will necessarily by a Skolem 
optimal solution to the original query. Since the (Y originally provided as input to 
Procedure 4.1 is also Skolem optimal, it follows that y’ and a are identical up to 
renaming of Skolem constants. 
It follows from this that y can differ from j3 only in that y has variables in some 
positions in which 0 has a Skolem constant. Suppose that si is the Skolem 
constant in /3 that has been replaced in y with a variable X. There are now two 
possibilities: 
1. If not every instance of si in p has been replaced with X, then the result of 
binding x to a new Skolem constant will be a Skolem optimal response to 
the original query of which (Y is a nontrivial Skolem instance. 
2. If every instance of si in /3 has been replaced with X, it follows that when si 
was considered by Procedure 4.1, the subgoal considered in step 3 of the 
procedure would have failed (since y is an acceptable response to the 
query), and si would have been rebound to a variable in the construction 
of p. 
In either case there is a contradiction, and this direction of the proof is complete. 
The converse is easier. If p is an optimal response to the original query, then 
the result 0’ of replacing the variables in p with Skolem constants will be Skolem 
optimal, and Procedure 4.1 can be used to reproduce p from p’. q 
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5. SUBGOALS WITH MONOTONIC JUSTIFICATIONS 
Let us now return to the more interesting problem of constructing a procedure 
that generates Skolem optimal responses to arbitrary queries. Suppose that we 
have begun with some query 4 that has been reduced to a collection of subgoals, 
some of which involve free variables in negative clauses. Let us denote such a 
subgoal by 7 s(x). A s we have seen, there are now four distinct possibilities: 
1. 7 s(x) holds for all X. 
2. Although 1 s(x) does not hold for all X, it holds for a set of measure 1 in 
the collection of possible x (presumably because of the PROLOG negation- 
as-failure rule applied to s). 
3. s(x) holds for all X. 
4. Although s(x) does not hold for all x, it holds for a set of measure 1 in the 
collection of all possible x, so that 7 s(x) holds only for a set of measure 0. 
The fourth possibility is that in which s is itself a consequence of other nonmono- 
tonic assumptions. For the time being, we will assume that this is not the case. 
Proposition 5.1. Let 7 s(x) be a negative subgoal containing free variables, but such 
that either the set of instantiations of x for which the subgoal succeeds is of 
measure 1, or the subgoal fails for every instantiation of x. Now if x’ is the result of 
replacing the variables in x with distinct Skolem constants, then: 
1. If the (ground) query 7 s(x’> fails, then so does 7 s(x). 
2. Zf 7 s(x’> succeeds, then x’ is a Skolem optimal response to the original 
subgoal. 
PROOF. Suppose first that 7 s(x’) fails. Then we know from Proposition 3.4 that 
the set of solutions to -, s(x) is of measure 0, and therefore (by our assumption) 
that 7 s(x) fails for all instantiations of x. 
Alternatively, if 7 s(x’) succeeds, then since replacing the Skolem constants in 
7 s(x’) with variables reproduces s(x) itself, it is clear that x’ is a Skolem optimal 
solution to the original query. 0 
As an example, we repeat the fragment of the previous section: 
f (x,y) :- not(g(y)). 
g(A). 
When presented with the query f(x, y), we generate the negative subgoal 7 g(y). 
Skolemizing y gives us the ground negative subgoal 7 g(si), which succeeds. We 
therefore bind y to s1 in the original query to obtain the Skolem optimal response 
f(x, sl). The response is in fact optimal in this case; we shall see a somewhat more 
interesting example in Section 8. 
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6. SUBGOALS WITH NONMONOTONIC JUSTIFICATIONS 
Imagine now that we were to use the techniques of the previous section to attempt 
to find a solution to the query f in the following situation: 
f :- not(g(x)). 
g(x) :- not(h(x)). 
h(A). 
The goal f generates the negative subgoal 7 g(x). The instantiation 7 g(s,) fails, 
although the instantiation 7 g(A) would succeed. 
In terms of the discussion in the previous section, we have a negative subgoal 
7 g(x) for which we can find a proof of the Skolemized version g(s,>. It follows 
that the set of x for which the original subgoal should succeed is of measure 0, but 
it does not follow that there is no solution to the subgoal at all (as we assumed 
earlier). 
What we need to do is to understand the failure of the Skolemized subgoal in a 
way that enables us to identify the instantiation x =A as a potential exception. 
Ideally, we would like to do this in a way that avoids repeating the search involved 
in the proof of g(s,>. 
We would also like to proceed in a way that allows us to generate and test 
possible exceptions to the proof of g(x) singly. As an example, suppose that h(B) 
also appeared in the above database. It is important that we be able to generate 
and consider the possible exception x =A before generating the possible exception 
x = B. The reason for this is that it may be computationally expensive to find such 
a potential exception [since doing so involves solving the subgoal h(x)], and we 
need to be able to treat such exceptions individually as backtrack points, rather 
than generating them all when the subgoal is encountered.’ 
Achieving this will not be difficult if we can identify a new subgoal t(x) such 
that solutions to this subgoal are candidate solutions to the original negative 
subgoal 7 s(x). In the example we are considering, for example, we have 7 s(x) = 
7 g(x) and would expect to have t(x) = h(x). 
To understand this, suppose that we have encountered a negative subgoal 
7 s(x), and that the instantiated version of this subgoal, -, s(sl), has failed. 
In order for 7 s(s,) to fail, there must be some proof of s(sl). This proof will 
appeal to the negation-as-failure rule applied to some predicates 
(perhaps with II = 0). It follows from this that 
7Pl(X) A *.. A -l&(X) +s(x) (2) 
in the conventional sense, without appealing to any additional nonmonotonic 
assumptions. It follows from this that exceptions to the nonground query s(x) will 
‘Once again, we see the difference between our approach and Chan’s constructive negation. By 
treating the solutions to g(x) singly, we ensure that the addition of the axiom h(B) to our database 
does not adversely affect the time needed to respond positively to the query f; this property is not 
shared by constructive negation, which must (at least on the face of it) enumerate all of the solutions to 
g(x) before proceeding. 
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necessarily be solutions to the new subgoal 
Note that if the proof of s(si) succeeded without appealing to the negation- 
as-failure rule at all, so that Vx.s(x) were entailed by our database, we would have 
n = 0 and the new subgoal, an empty disjunction, would be tautologically false. The 
upshot of this is that we will not attempt to overturn any proofs that did not use 
the negation-as-failure rule in the first place. 
Slightly more generally, there will be a variety of proofs of s(st), where the ith 
proof depends on negation-as-failure assumptions about piI,. . . , pin,. Similarly to 
(2), we can conclude that 
VA 7Pij+s(s1)9 
i j 
so that any solution to the original negative subgoal 7 s(x) must be a solution to 
the new subgoal 
7 V A 7Pij= A V Pij’ (3) 
i j i j 
Finally, we note that solutions to the subgoal appearing in (3) still need to be 
checked as solutions to the original negative subgoal. This is because there may be 
facts in the database that, although not involved in the failure of the original 
Skolemized subgoal, nevertheless invalidate the instantiations suggested by the 
consideration of (3). 
Here, then, is the procedure for the evaluation of a negative subgoal with free 
variables: 
Procedure 6.2. To evaluate a negative subgoal 7 s(xl,. . . , xk, C,, . . . , C,>, where 
the xi are free variables and the C, are ground terms: 
1. Replace the variables with Skolem constants and invoke the interpreter on 
the result. 
2. If the Skolemized subgoal succeeds, return it as the solution to the original 
negative subgoal. 
3. If the Skolemized subgoal fails, identify the negation-as-failure assumptions 
responsible for the failure, and construct the new subgoal appearing in (3). 
4. For each solution ET to this new subgoal, where (J is a binding list for some 
of the variables appearing in the original negative subgoal, invoke the 
procedure recursively on the new negative subgoal 7 s(x)l,. 
As an example, we return to the program fragment that began this section. Here 
it is again: 
f :- not(g(x)). 
g(x) :- notCh(x 
h(A). 
The goal f generates the negative subgoal 7 g(x); Skolemizing gives the 
subgoal 1 g(s,). Since attempting to prove h(s,) succeeds, the Skolemized subgoal 
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7 g(s,) fails. But we note that the proof of g(s,> involves applying the negation- 
as-failure rule to h(s,), and this in turn leads us to consider the positive subgoal 
h(x). This subgoal succeeds with x bound to A, so we reconsider the original 
negative subgoal 7 g(x), binding x not to s1 but to A. Since h(A) succeeds, 
1 h(A) fails, and g(A) fails. We therefore return x =A as a solution to the 
original negative subgoal, and the query f succeeds. 
If, on the other hand, we augment he above database with the statement g ( A 1, 
then the instantiated negative subgoal 7 g(A) fails, and the original query fails as 
well. 
Here is a more subtle example, where the query is f ( x , y 1: 
f(x,y) :- not(g(x,y)). 
g(x,y) :- notCh(x 
h(A). 
g (A/y) :- not(j(y)). 
j(B). 
Now the negative subgoal 7 g(x, y) instantiates to 7 g(s,, s2). This subgoal 
fails, since 7 h(s,) succeeds. But the success involves the application of the 
negation-as-failure rule to h, so we are led to the positive subgoal h(x). This 
succeeds for x bound to A, so we bind x in the original subgoal to obtain 
1 gU, y). 
Applying the procedure recursively, we Skolemize 7 g(A, y) to obtain 
7 gL4, sJ. This subgoal also fails, since 1 j(s,) succeeds. Once again, the failure 
is due to the application of the negation-as-failure rule (to j this time), so we 
consider the new subgoal j(y), which succeeds for y bound to B. We bind y to B 
in the subgoal 7 g(A, y) to obtain 7 g(A, B). This query finally succeeds, allow- 
ing us to return x =A, y = B as a solution to the original query. 
Proposition 6.2. In a language without function symbols, suppose that our interpreter 
always terminates on positive subgoals and ground queries. Then provided that 
every variable appearing in the body of a database rule also appears in its head, 
Procedure 6.1 will terminate as well. 
PROOF. The procedure can fail to terminate only if it continues to call itself 
recursively. But note that the positive subgoals constructed in step 3 of the 
procedure can never succeed without instantiating at least one of their variables. 
(If they did, the original Skolemized subgoal would have succeeded as well.) 
It follows that the new subgoal passed recursively to the procedure will have 
fewer free variables than its predecessor, so that the procedure must terminate 
eventually. 0 
This result fails if the assumptions are weakened. The reason is that the positive 
subgoal introduced in step 3 of the procedure may itself spawn negative subgoals, 
and the optimal responses to these subgoals may introduce new variables into the 
original subgoal and thereby cause the evaluation procedure to fail to terminate. 
As we shall see in Section 8, simple planning problems tend to contain features of 
just this sort. 
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More important than Proposition 6.2, of course, is the following: 
Proposition 6.3. Let 7 s(x) be a negative subgoal containing free variables. Then the 
result of applying Procedure 6.1 to 1 SC x) is a Skolem optimal response to it, and 
any such response can be generated in this fashion. 
PROOF. The proof is in fact quite straightforward. We know from Proposition 5.1 
that as soon as the Skolemized subgoal has succeeded, a Skolem optimal response 
to the bound subgoal 7 s(x)/, will have been produced. Since we know that every 
solution to the original negative subgoal solves 7 ~(~11, for one of the (T’S 
produced in the final step of the procedure, it follows from the Skolem optimality 
of these (T’S that any Skolem optimal solution to the modified subgoal will be a 
Skolem optimal solution to the original one. 0 
7. MULTIPLE SUBGOALS 
There is one additional subtlety that appears if Procedure 6.1 is to be used in 
practice. Consider the following PROLOG fragment: 
f(x) :- g(x),not(h(x)). 
g(A). 
h(B). 
When presented with the query f(x), the subgoal g(x) is evaluated, binding x to 
A. This leads to the ground negative subgoal 7 h(A), which succeeds, so that the 
original goal returns f(A). But suppose that the order of the two clauses in the 
definition of f had been reversed: 
f(x) :- not(h(x)),g(x). 
g(A). 
h(B). 
Now the negative subgoal 1 h(x) succeeds by binding x to the Skolem constant si, 
and the positive subgoal g(s,) fails. The problem is that the positive subgoal 
should be looking for a solution that is a Skolem instance of g(s,), as opposed to 
an instantiation of it in the conventional sense. 
There are two ways around this difficulty. The simpler one is merely to always 
consider positive subgoals before negative ones. In some instances, however, this 
may be overly restrictive: 
f (x,y) :- not(g(x,y)), hard(x). 





We are supposing that the subgoal h a r d ( x 1 succeeds by binding x to A or B, but 
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that the evaluation of this subgoal is computationally expensive. Since applying 
Procedure 6.1 to the subgoal 7 g(x, y) also binds x to A, it is important that the 
subgoals be evaluated in the order in which they are supplied. 
The alternative approach overcomes this difficulty by replacing the Skolem 
constants appearing in an arbitrary positive subgoal s with variables to obtain S as 
in Definition 3.6. The resulting subgoal is then solved and the Skolem constants 
replaced. Any solutions to S that bind newly introduced variables away from 
Skolem constants will need to be checked to ensure that they remain solutions to 
the negative subgoals that introduced the Skolem constants in the first place. It is 
clear that this procedure is correct, since all it is really doing is ensuring that the 
matcher recognizes Skolem instances of the solution to a particular negative 
subgoal. 
8. AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE: PLANNING 
In order to show our ideas at work, we will now consider in some detail slightly 
more difficult examples of the problems we have been discussing. 
The application we will consider is that of planning and reasoning about action, 
working with a truly nonmonotonic description of our domain. We do this in part 
because it is the nonmonotonic nature of the description that leads to negative 
subgoals with free variables, but also because it appears [14,15] that a nonmono- 
tonic description will be the only computationally tractable one as the domains 
encountered by general-purpose planning systems grow increasingly complex. 
Rather than discuss complex domains, however, we will consider only simple 
blocks-world problems. The positions of objects will be described using a predicate 
on(b,Z), indicating that the block b is at the location 1. 
We will work with a simple version of the situation calculus, denoting the fact 
that some sentence p holds in a situation s by writing 
holds(p,s). 
A situation will be written as an ordered sequence of actions 
s= (a .,...,a,). 
(We write the last action first so that we can append new actions to the front of the 
sequence.) The initial situation is written simply as ( >, corresponding to the empty 
sequence of actions. 
We will denote by (aIs> the result of performing the action a in the situation s. 
The frame axion, a default rule saying that things tend to stay the same as time 
goes by, is now written as 
holds(p,s) A lab(a,p,s) -+ holds(p,(uls)). (4) 
In other words, if p holds in a situation s, and the action a is not abnormal in that 
its execution potentially reverses p, then p will continue to hold in the resulting 
state (aIs>. 
There is a single action in this domain, m o v e(b, 0, which relocates a block b at 
a location 1. The preconditions for this action are that the block being moved and 
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the target location both be clear. Formally, we have: 
holds(clear(b),s) A holds(clear(l),s) 
+ holds(on(b,l),(move(b,l)Js)) (5) 
together with the axiom defining c 1 e a r as 
holds(clear(x),s) =ay.holds(on(y,x),s). (6) 
Of course, the existential quantifier appearing in (6) forces us to modify this 
description somewhat if we are to use a PROLOG-like theorem prover. Here is a 
suitable redescription? 
holds(p,s) :- append(sl,s2,s), holds(p,s2), not(ab(sl,p,s2)). 
hold.s(on(b,l),Cmove(b,l~~sl~ :- not(occupied(b,s)), 
not(occupied(l,s)). 
occupied(x,s) :- holds(on(y,x),s). 
Note that we have modified the frame axiom somewhat so that we can conclude 
at a single stroke that the sentence p will be preserved through the action 
sequence sl. In addition to being more efficient than the previous description, this 
modification is necessary if negative subgoals involving the frame axiom are to be 
dealt with properly. Taking s2 to be the initial situation ( >, we get as a conse- 
quence of this modified axiom that 
holds(p,()) A lab(s,p,()) + holds(p,s). (7) 
In other words, in the absence of an abnormality, things true in the initial situation 
will be true in all subsequent situations. 
Note also that we cannot rewrite the second PROLOG rule as 
holds(on(b,l), Cmove(b,l)lsl) :- not(holds(on(x,b),s), 
not(holds(on(y,l),s), 
since the semantics we have assigned to this expression are different from those of 
the original one.’ (The above rule allows us to move b to I if there is any block x 
that is not on b, and any block y that is not already at 1.) 





The blocks A and B are both on the table, and C is on top of B. The goals we will 
consider are those of getting either C or B on top of A. 
8As we shall see shortly, we shall also need the contrapositive version of the frame axiom (4), since 
we shall need to be able to derive (for example) a b&, p, sl) if p does not persist through the execution 
of the action sequence s2 in the situation sl. 
‘The semantics are in fact the same under the conventional interpretation described in Footnote 2. 
Although this is an argument for the standard interpretation, there is no way to express an axiom such 
as (1) using standard methods. 




L2 FIGURE 1. Get either B or C onto A. 
Consider first the goal of getting C on A, corresponding to the PROLOG query 
holds(on(C,A) ,s). 





Instantiating t to a Skolem constant in the first subgoal, we obtain 
not(occupied(C,Sl)), 
and this subgoal succeeds. In addition, applying Procedure 4.1, we see that this is 
an optimal solution to the original negative subgoal. 
In accord with the ideas of Section 7, we replace the Skolem constant s1 with 
the variable t when processing the second subgoal (8). This subgoal also succeeds 
with f bound to sl, so that we finally conclude that the original query 
holds(on(C,A),s) holdsfors boundto Cmove(C,A)ISll. 
We now view the proof process as complete, returning the answer schema 
Cmove(C,A) (SII, (9) 
where the Skolem constant s1 denotes an unspecified situation (i.e., sequence of 
actions). If we wish, we can substitute the empty action sequence C 1 for the 
Skolem constant sl, producing the simpler result binding s to Cm ov e ( C , A )I. Of 
course, this new answer will need to be tested to make sure that the default rules 
leading to the Skolemized conclusion are not violated when we replace the Skolem 
constant with a particularly convenient value. 
If our theorem prover can deal with conjunctive subgoals, we can streamline this 
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simultaneously. Since the conjoined negative subgoal 
Toccupied(C,t) A Toccupied(A,t) 
succeeds by binding t to sl, we avoid one invocation of Procedure 4.1. 
Note that constructive negation is completely incapable of dealing with this 
problem. If it were our intention to return a “complete” answer to the original 
query, we would have to modify (9) in some way so that it included information 
about those situations s’ that violated the frame axiom (7) and could therefore not 
be instantiated into the solution schema given by (9). 
Unfortunately, this is completely unsuitable for problems such as the one we are 
considering-how are we possibly to enumerate all of the states s’ in which 
something is on top of C or of A? There are infinitely many such states, arrived at 
by infinitely many distinct action sequences. In this particular case, not only is the 
schema (9) a reasonable response to the original query (indeed, it is optimal in the 
sense of Definition 3.6); it is the only response available. Applying the techniques 
of previous authors will fail to return an answer at all. 
Let us now turn to the more difficult of the two planning problems, correspond- 
ing to the goal ho 1 d s (on (B, A 1, s 1. Resolving it with the description of the 
move action leads to the compound negative subgoal 
Toccupied(B,t) A Toccupied(A,t). 
Instantiating t produces 
Toccupied(B,s,) A Toccupied(A,s,). 
Although the second clause succeeds, the first clause here fails, since 
o c c up i e d ( B , S 1 1 is a consequence of the default assumption 
not(ab(Sl,on(C,B),Cl)). 
Procedure 6.1 now leads to the construction of the new positive subgoal 
ab(t,on(C,B),Cl). 
In order to solve this subgoal, we need some way to conclude that an action 
sequence t is abnormal. This involves a contrapositive version of the frame axiom: 
ab(s1 ,p,sZ) :- 
holds(p,sZ), append(s1 ,s2,s), not(holds(p,s)). (IO) 
Note, however, that the negation appearing in this axiom should be interpreted not 
using the negation-as-failure rule, but in terms of an ability to actually prove 
not ( ho 1 d s ( p , s ) ) directly. After all, we are only prepared to conclude that an 
action sequence is abnormal if we can prove without usifig negation as failure that 
some sentence has changed from true to false when the action sequence is 
executed. This leads us to rewrite (10) as 
ab(s1 ,p,s2) :- 
holds(p,s2), append(s1 ,s2,s), no-holds(p,s)), 
where no - h o 1 d s is a predicate introduced for this purpose. Given this axiom, 
the subgoal ab(t,on(C,B),Cl) now leads to the new subgoal 
no - ho 1 d s (on ( C , B) , t 1). Informally, we can show that an action sequence is 
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abnormal with respect to C being on B provided that we can demonstrate that it 
actively causes on ( C , B 1 to become false. 
At this point, we need an axiom stating conditions under which C will no longer 
be on B-nowhere in our domain description, for example, is there an axiom 
saying that a block can be in only one place at a time! The following is suitable: 
no-holds(on(x,y) ,s) :- holds(on(x,z) ,s>, not(y=z). 
This axiom does indeed say that a block can be in only one place at a time. 
Resolvingitwithoursubgoalno-holds(on(C,B),t) leadsto 
t=Cmove(C,z) lul, 
together with the compound negative subgoal 
Toccupied(C,u) A Toccupied(t,u) A (B#z). 
Instantiating u to s2 and z to s3, this subgoal succeeds. 
Inserting t = Cmove(B,A) ,move(C,S3) 1 S21 into our original subgoal, we 
get 
~occupied(B,(move(C,S3)IS2)) A loccupied(A,(move(C,S3)ISz)). 
This subgoal succeeds, and we therefore return as a final answer the action 
sequence 
Cmove(B,A) ,move(C,S3) IS21. (11) 
It is only an answer schema that is returned, of course. The interpretation of 
(11) is as follows: To get B onto A, perform an arbitrary (but hopefully nonpatho- 
logical) sequence of actions s2. Then move C somewhere, and put B on A. The 
choices A and B will be pathological instantiations of s3, as it turns out. 
8.1. Implementation Concerns and Results 
Examining step 3 of Procedure 6.1, we see that when the proof of the negated 
Skolemized subgoal succeeds (so that the proof of the Skolemized subgoal itself 
fails), we need to know which negation-as-failure assumptions were involved in the 
successful proof. 
There are a variety of possible ways to achieve this when implementing the 
ideas we have presented. The simplest is probably to use an ATMS [8] when 
evaluating the negated subgoal. As discussed in [12,21], an ATMS can be used to 
return the minimal set of assumptions needed to support a given conclusion; such 
a set is just what is needed to construct the new subgoal appearing in (3). (Reiter 
and de Kleer refer to such a minimal set as a prime implicant .) 
This observation was used to incorporate the work we have described into the 
multivalued theorem prover discussed in [12]; the reason this theorem prover was 
used is that it already combines techniques from both truth maintenance and 
default reasoning. The two planning problems we have discussed were then solved 
using the techniques we have developed. The principal purpose of the implementa- 
tion was to contrast the time needed by the approach we have presented with the 
time needed to solve the problems using conventional monotonic techniques such 
as those discussed in [ll]. In both cases, general-purpose planning techniques were 
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used, as opposed to special-purpose methods developed to deal with the blocks- 
world domain only. 
Compromises had to be made in both implementations. In the nonmonotonic 
case, some of the well-known problems involved in using nonmonotonic techniques 
to reason about action were encountered [16]. These difficulties were overcome by 
assigning specified priorities to various default assumptions. The resulting system 
was indeed able to solve the planning problems we have discussed, and the 
inference paths were as described earlier. The axiomatization was quite brittle, 
however, and is unlikely to be useful in dealing with more complex problems in this 
domain. The recent work in [2] will be able to address these difficulties, but has not 
yet been combined with the techniques that are the subject of this paper. 
In the monotonic case, two compromises were made. The monotonic version of 
the frame axiom (4) will be something like 
holds(on(b,l),Cmove(b’,L’)ls3) :- holds(on(b,l),s), not(b=b’) 
which says that moving a block b’ will never change the location of a different 
block b. Unfortunately, this axiom leads to recursive inference paths. It was 
therefore replaced with two separate versions which could be used for action 
sequences of length 1 or 2: 
holds(on(b,l),Cmove(b’,L’)1) :- holds(on(b,L),Cl), not(b=b’). 
holds(on(b,l),Cmove(b’,l’~,al) :- holds(on(b,l),Cal), 
not(b=b’). 
This replacement is sufficient to allow the solution of our two simple problems, but 
is obviously not strong enough to solve anything more difficult. 
The other “compromise” made was that the description used did not include 
any information regarding the “delete lists” of the actions being considered. If the 
system needed to know that moving C onto A resulted in C’s no longer being on 
B, it had to prove that by using the fact that C would be on A after the action was 
performed, and that blocks could only be in one place at a time. This description, 
although not as efficient as one that explicitly lists all of the positive and negative 
consequences of an action, seemed reasonable for two reasons. First, no such 
explicit description was made. available to the nonmonotonic planner that was 
solving the same problems. Second, it appears [14] that it will not in general be 
possible to precompute all of the ramifications of an action in a complex domain. 
Finally, the monotonic planner needed to be told of the existence of a new 
location L,. Otherwise, it had no place to put C when it wanted to move B 
onto A. 
Both problems were presented to the systems, running on a Symbolics 3620. The 
speed of the interpreter used was such that both systems were capable of 
performing approximately 50 inferences/second. The nonmonotonic approach 
solved the simpler of the two problems in about 4 seconds, and the more complex 
one in about 6. The monotonic approach solved the simple problem immediately, 
but took 18 seconds on the more difficult one. 
Why should the nonmonotonic system be faster? The reason is simply that the 
inferences performed by this approach are very much like those taken by a human 
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planner: First, a simple plan is constructed that achieves the goal based on default 
assumptions about the domain. If some of these defaut assumptions are found to 
be invalid, the plan is then modified in such a way that the difficulty is overcome. 
In our particular case, the defaults used involved assuming that various blocks 
were clear. When the assumption that B was clear was found to be invalid in the 
second planning problem, a new sequence of actions was developed that would 
cause B to be clear after all, and this patch was spliced into the flawed plan to 
create an acceptable one. 
The monotonic planner was not able to focus its search in this fashion; it had no 
way of knowing that the naive plan of simply moving B onto A was in any way 
“close” to a solution to the problem. It therefore needed to perform a laborious 
backtrack through its domain description, regressing all of the preconditions to the 
various actions through all of the actions it was considering, and so on. The result 
was that it spent a great deal of time working on problems that turned out to have 
no relevance to the eventual solution it discovered. 
There have been many suggestions recently that general-purpose planning must 
work in the way our nonmonotonic approach proceeded: Potential plans are 
constructed (or retrieved from a library of such plans), criticized, and modified if 
necessary to overcome any obstacles that are discovered. There has been little 
formal work on what it means to criticize a plan, however, and no work at all on 
the problem of patching a flawed plan. What we have seen here is that both the 
criticism and recovery processes can be described naturally in terms of the 
evaluation of negative subgoals with free variables, and that the ideas we have 
developed can therefore be used to give us a formal handle on a very attractive 
approach to planning generally. 
9. CONCLUSION 
We conclude with some informal remarks regarding the computational nature of 
the procedure we have described. 
Because of the undecidable nature of consistency checking, there are serious 
computational problems involved in the use of any nonmonotonic description of a 
domain. Nevertheless, it has been argued elsewhere ([14,15] is typical) that 
commonsense reasoning must ultimately depend upon‘nonmonotonic techniques if 
we are to model domains complex enough to be interesting. 
This paper has discussed one of the issues that will need to be addressed if we 
are to use nonmonotonic reasoning to construct such a commonsense reasoning 
system-the appearance of default queries containing free variables. We have 
presented a procedure for dealing with such queries, shown several fairly simple 
examples of the procedure in action, and formalized the nature of the answers 
returned by this procedure. We have also seen that existing proposals for dealing 
with these queries appear to be unable to address the problems likely to arise in’ 
planning and commonsense reasoning. 
It might appear that the complexity of the procedure when applied to even the 
very simplest of planning problems will result in our methods being unsuitable as 
these problems become more difficult, but this is not the case. The reason is that 
the work actually done in developing the simple plans we have considered is 
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remarkably parallel to the effort we would expect to make from a commonsense 
point of view. As a result, even very simple planning problems can be solved more 
efficiently using our techniques than by an appeal to purely monotonic methods. 
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